A rare shift is taking shape in Russia’s war against Ukraine. After a long period in which Russia held most of the initiative on the front, Ukraine is regaining room for manoeuvre. This is not the result of a single breakthrough, but of several changes building at once: pressure on Russian logistics, deeper Ukrainian strikes inside Russia, better adaptation on the battlefield, and the growing role of Ukraine’s own defence production.
In an article for Nettavisen Nyheter, Tormod Malvin Sæther examines this shift through interviews with Lesia Ogryzko, Director of Sahaidachnyi Security Center, and Yurii Buhai, who serves in the Armed Forces of Ukraine and works with the Ministry of Defence Reform Office.
Lesia Ogryzko describes the current moment as only the second time since Russia’s full-scale invasion that Ukraine has held an operational advantage over Russia. The first came during the counteroffensive of autumn 2022.
“We finally see a new window of opportunity, but we believe it will close relatively quickly,” Lesia Ogryzko said. Many Ukrainian experts estimate it at six to nine months.
Several factors explain the current shift:
- Ukraine has become more effective at disrupting Russian supply lines before troops and equipment reach the front.
- Ukrainian commanders have become better at identifying where Russia is likely to concentrate large forces and at blocking advances in key areas, especially in the south and east.
- The manpower balance is also becoming more difficult for Moscow. For the first time, Lesia Ogryzko argues, the pace of Russian losses may be higher than Russia’s ability to replace them.
- Ukraine is also striking deeper inside Russia. Long-range drones are hitting energy infrastructure and oil refineries — assets that help finance and sustain Russia’s war machine. Since March, Ukraine has reportedly sent more strike drones into Russia than Russia has sent into Ukraine.
For Lesia Ogryzko, one of the most important changes is political and psychological. After expected U.S. aid packages did not materialise, Ukraine had to stop assuming that Western weapons would arrive on time. Ukraine can now produce many of the weapons it needs domestically, but this production still depends on external financing.
This is where support from Ukraine’s partners can have the greatest effect, not only by sending weapons, but by financing Ukrainian defence production while the window remains open.
Lesia Ogryzko believes Ukraine should use the current pressure either “to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia” or “to force it to sit down at the negotiating table on Ukrainian terms.”
At the same time, she warns that Ukraine cannot rely on its current advantage in drone warfare indefinitely. The war has repeatedly shown how quickly technological advantages can be met with countermeasures.
Yurii Buhai also cautions against treating time as an unlimited resource. At the beginning of the full-scale invasion, many believed Kyiv would fall in three days. Today, many assume Ukraine can resist Russia indefinitely.
“Both are equally wrong,” Yurii Buhai said. “Our soldiers and civilians are tired after more than four years of full-scale war.”
For more insights, read the full article in Nettavisen Nyheter